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We develop an analytically  tractable  two-country  model that marries 
a full account  of global macroeconomic  dynamics  to a supply frame- 
work based on monopolistic  competition  and sticky  nominal prices. 
The model offers simple and intuitive predictions  about exchange 
rates and current accounts  that sometimes  differ sharply  from those 
of either modern flexible-price  intertemporal  models or traditional 
sticky-price  Keynesian  models. Our analysis  leads to a novel perspec- 
tive on  the international welfare spillovers due to monetary and 
fiscal policies. 
I.  Introduction 
This paper offers  a theory that incorporates  the price rigidities essen- 
tial to explain  exchange  rate behavior without  sacrificing the insights 
of  the  intertemporal  approach  to  the  current  account.  Until  now, 
thinking  on open-economy  macroeconomics  has been  largely schizo- 
phrenic.  Most of  the  theoretical  advances  since  the  late  1970s  have 
been  achieved  by assuming  away the awkward reality of sticky prices 
and  instead  developing  the  implications  of  dynamic  optimization  by 
the private sector. While the intertemporal  approach has proved valu- 
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able  for  some  facets  of  current-account  analysis,  many  of  the  most 
fundamental  problems  in  international  finance  cannot  be  seriously 
addressed  in a setting of frictionless markets. Because the newer para- 
digm  seems  so  ill  equipped  to  explain,  for  example,  the  effects  of 
macroeconomic  policies  on  output  and  exchange  rates,  empirical 
practitioners  and policymakers  have not yet been persuaded  to aban- 
don  traditional  aggregative  Keynesian  models. 
While  the  time-tested  appeal  of  those  models  is undeniable,  their 
lack  of  microfoundations  presents  problems  at  many  levels.  They 
ignore  the  intertemporal  budget  constraints  central  to any coherent 
picture  of  the  current  account  and  fiscal  policy.  They  provide  no 
clear description  of how monetary policy affects production  decisions. 
Because  the  traditional  approach  embodies  no  meaningful  welfare 
criteria, it can yield  profoundly  misleading  policy prescriptions  even 
for problems  it was designed  to address,  as we shall show. 
This  paper  builds a bridge  between  the rigor of the intertemporal 
approach,  as exemplified  by Sachs (1981),  Obstfeld  (1982),  and Fren- 
kel  and  Razin  (1987),  and  the  descriptive  plausibility  of  the  classic 
contributions  of  Fleming  (1962),  Mundell  (1963,  1964),  and  Dorn- 
busch  (1976).  We develop  a model  of  international  policy  transmis- 
sion that embodies  the main elements  of the intertemporal  approach 
along  with  short-run  nominal  price  rigidities  and  explicit  micro- 
foundations  of aggregate  supply.  Our general  approach  permits  the 
formal  welfare  evaluation  of  international  macroeconomic  policies 
and institutions,  a procedure  central to public finance and trade the- 
ory but largely absent from previous  discussions of international  eco- 
nomic  fluctuations. 
A framework  integrating  exchange  rate dynamics  and the current 
account  yields  a new  perspective  on  both.  For example,  the  model 
predicts  that money  supply  shocks can have real effects  that last well 
beyond  the time frame of any nominal  rigidities, because of induced 
short-run  wealth  accumulation  via  the  current  account.  Another 
finding  is that an unanticipated  permanent  rise in world government 
purchases  temporarily  lowers  world  real interest  rates: when  prices 
are  sticky,  the  government  spending  shock  raises  short-run  output 
above  long-run  output,  and  world  real  interest  rates  fall  as agents 
attempt  to  smooth  consumption.  Beyond  such  specific  results,  the 
real payoff from the new approach,  once again, is a framework within 
which  one  can  address  the  most  important  issues  in  international 
finance  (exchange  rate regimes,  international  transmission  of macro- 
economic  policies,  sources of current-account  imbalances,  and so on) 
without  sacrificing  either  empirical  realism  or  the  rigor  of  explict 
welfare  analysis. 
Our  model  embeds  features  of  the  static, closed-economy  models 626  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
of  Blanchard  and  Kiyotaki (1987)  and  Ball and  Romer  (1989)  in an 
analytically  tractable,  dynamic,  two-country  framework.  Section  II 
sets  out  an  infinite-horizon  monetary  model  of  a  monopolistically 
competitive  world  economy.  We show how to solve for the long-run 
and short-run  equilibria of  a log-linearized  version  of  the model.  In 
Section  III  we  analyze  positive  and  normative  aspects  of  monetary 
and fiscal policy. Section  IV catalogs a number  of possible extensions 
of  the model,  and  Section  V presents  conclusions. 
Various  elements  of our approach  can be found  in earlier work by 
several  authors.  Each  component  of  Mussa's  (1984)  aggregative 
model  is  inspired  by  individual  maximization,  but  the  model  as  a 
whole  lacks an  integrative  foundation.  McKibbin and  Sachs  (1991) 
and  Stockman  and  Ohanian  (1993)  develop  numerical  sticky-price 
models that incorporate  intertemporal  maximization but lack founda- 
tions  on  the  supply  side.  The  model  of  Calvo and  V6gh  (1993)  as- 
sumes  sticky prices and demand-determined  output  but presents  no 
rationale for the latter assumption.  Also, its small-country setting pre- 
vents  analysis  of  international  transmission  issues.  Romer  (1993) 
models a world of two interacting monopolistically  competitive  econo- 
mies, but his analysis is static and  its microfoundations  are not  fully 
specified.  Dixon  (1993)  surveys  other  static open-economy  models 
based on imperfect  competition.  Perhaps the closest precursor  to our 
study  is the  paper  by Svensson  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1989);  but  its 
assumption  of perfectly  pooled  international  risks, aside from uneas- 
ily  matching  its  pricing  and  rationing  assumptions,  precludes  dis- 
cussion of  the international  wealth redistributions  that are central to 
our analysis.' 
II.  Macroeconomic Policies in a Two-Country 
Model with Monopolistic Competition: 
Flexible Prices 
In  this  section  we  describe  the  setup  of  the  model  and  some  of  its 
properties  when  nominal  output  prices are flexible. 
A.  Preferences,  Technology,  and Market Structure 
The  world  is inhabited  by a continuum  of  individual  producers,  in- 
dexed  by z E  [0,  1], each  of  whom  produces  a single  differentiated 
' Recently  Beaudry  and Devereux (1994) have explored multiple  equilibria  within a 
related framework  with flexible  prices,  investment,  and increasing  returns.  They focus 
on an equilibrium  isomorphic  to one with  predetermined  nominal  goods prices.  Several 
of the properties  of that equilibrium  (e.g., long-run real effects due to purely nominal 
shocks)  are consistent  with predictions  of our model. EXCHANGE  RATE  DYNAMICS  627 
perishable  product.  The  home  country  consists of  producers  on  the 
interval  [0, n], and  the remaining  (n, 1] producers  reside  in the for- 
eign  country. 
Individuals  everywhere  in  the  world  have  the  same  preferences, 
which  are  defined  over  a consumption  index,  real money  balances, 
and  effort  expended  in production.  Let c(z) be a home  individual's 
consumption  of  product  z. The  consumption  index,  on which utility 
depends,  is given  by 
0/(O  -  1) 
C=  [I c(z)(0-l)/Odz]  (1) 
where  0 >  1. The  foreign  consumption  index  C* is defined  analo- 
gously  (throughout,  asterisks denote  foreign  variables). 
There  are no impediments  or costs to trade between  the countries. 
Let E be  the  nominal  exchange  rate, defined  as the  home-currency 
price  of  foreign  currency,  p(z) the  domestic-currency  price  of  good 
z, and p*(z) the price of the same good  in foreign  currency. Then  the 
law of one  price holds  for every good,  so that 
p(z) = Ep*(z).  (2) 
The  consumption-based  money  price index2  in the home  country 
is 
P=  LfP(z)1 edz1 
{  p(z)'9dz  + I  [Ep*(z)]-dz} 
Since  both  countries'  residents  have  the  same  preferences,  equation 
(2) implies that 
P  = EP*.  (4) 
There is an integrated  world capital  market  in which both countries 
can borrow and lend. The  only asset they trade is a real bond, denom- 
inated  in  the  composite  consumption  good.  Let  r, denote  the  real 
interest  rate earned  on  bonds  between  dates  t and  t  +  1, and  let F, 
and  M,  denote  the  stocks of  bonds  and  domestic  money  held  by a 
home  resident  entering  date  t  +  1. Residents  of  a country  derive 
utility from  that country's  currency  only,  and  not  from  foreign  cur- 
2The  price index is defined as the minimal  expenditure  of domestic  money needed 
to purchase a unit of C. 628  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
rency.  Individual  z's period  budget  constraint  therefore  is 
PtFt + Mt = Pt(l  +  rt-I)Ft- I + Mt- I + Pt(z)yt(z) -  PtCt -  PtTt,  (5) 
where y(z) is the individual's output  and T denotes  real taxes paid to 
the  domestic  government  (which  can  be  negative  in  the  event  of 
money  transfers). 
A home  resident  z maximizes  a utility function  that depends  posi- 
tively on  consumption  and  real balances  and negatively  on  work ef- 
fort, which is positively  related  to output:3 
Ut 
l 
[logCs 
+  1  P  YS(z)21  (6) 
In equation  (6), 0  <  P3  <  1 and e  >  0.' 
Given the utility function  (6), a home individual's demand  for prod- 
uct z in period  t is 
ct(Z)  [Pt  ct]0 
so  that  0 is the  elasticity  of  demand  with  respect  to  relative  price. 
Foreign  residents  have the same demand  functions. 
We assume  that home  and  foreign  government  purchases  of  con- 
sumption  goods  do  not  directly  affect  private utility. Per capita real 
home  government  consumption  expenditure,  G, is  a composite  of 
government  consumptions  of individual goods, g(z), in the same man- 
ner  as  private  consumption;  for  simplicity,  we  assume  identical 
weights.5 The  same is true for G*. Since Ricardian equivalence  holds 
3 Here  we adopt  a money-in-the-utility-function  approach  to introducing  currency, 
but a cash-in-advance  version of the model yields qualitatively similar results (see Obst- 
feld  and  Rogoff  1996).  The  most  significant  difference  in the cash-in-advance  model 
is that welfare  results  on  the  international  transmission  of  policies  (see Sec.  IIIC)  do 
not depend  on any parameter  assumptions.  Feenstra  (1986)  discusses the equivalence 
of  money-in-the-utility-function  and  transaction-technology  approaches  to  money 
demand. 
4 A more general formulation  than eq. (6) allows the elasticity of intertemporal  substi- 
tution,  a,  to differ  from  one  and  the  elasticity of  disutility  from  output,  denoted  by 
p. '  1, to differ  from  two: 
U  =  I  1  CP(  f- )'u  +  1  (MP)  _YK  (Z)I] 
Allowing  for  this  more  general  formulation  enriches  the  comparative  statics results 
but  is not  essential  for  any of  the  central  points  made  below.  For a discussion  of  the 
more  general  case, see Obstfeld  and  Rogoff  (1994). 
That  is, 
G =  f Lg(z)1)/edz  (I0  l) EXCHANGE RATE DYNAMICS  629 
in this model,  nothing  is lost by simply assuming  that all government 
purchases  are financed  by taxes and seigniorage: 
Gt=  Tt  +  Mt  Mt- 
M* - M*  l7 
G*  T* + 
_ 
t 
Governments  take  producer  prices  as given  when  allocating  their 
spending  among goods.  Adding  up private and government  demands 
therefore  shows that the producer  of good  z faces the period  t world 
demand  curve: 
yt(z)  =  [p  ]1(Cw + Gw),  (8) 
where 
Ctw-nC  +  (I  -n)C*  (9) 
is world private consumption  demand,  which producers  take as given, 
and 
Gw  nGt +  (1-n)G*  (10) 
is world government  demand.  Equation  (8) makes  use  of  (2) and  (4), 
which  imply  that the  real  price  of  good  z is the  same  at home  and 
abroad. 
Each individual  producer  has a degree  of monopoly  power.  Thus, 
in the aggregate,  a country  faces a downward-sloping  world demand 
curve for its output,  as in Dornbusch  (1976).  Purchasing power parity 
holds  for  consumer  price  indexes  (eq.  [4]),  but  only  because  both 
countries  consume  identical  commodity  baskets.  Purchasing  power 
parity does not hold for national output  deflators, and thus the terms 
of  trade can change.6 
B.  Individual Maximization 
Use  (8) to eliminate Pt(z) from (5),7 and then maximize lifetime  utility 
(6) subject to the resulting  budget  constraint,  taking world demand, 
The  model  can be extended  to give the government  a preference  for home  goods,  but 
the case in the  text is notationally  simpler. 
6 In an extended  version  of the model  incorporating  nontraded  goods,  many of the 
basic results derived  below still follow despite  the fact that eq. (4) need  no longer  hold. 
7 The  substitution  yields 
p1(z)y'(z)  =  PtY1(Z)(0-1)/e(Ctw  +  GwI'l1. 630  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Cw +  Gw, as given.  Define  the home-currency  nominal  interest  rate 
on date t, it, by 
I +  it =  p  (I  +  rt),  (11) 
with an analogous  definition  for the foreign-currency  nominal  inter- 
est rate. Note  that, because purchasing  power parity holds, real inter- 
est rate equality implies  uncovered  interest  parity: 
l+  i=  E~ (I + i*). 
t 
The  first-order conditions  for the maximization  problems of home 
and foreign  individuals  are 
Ct+=  13(1  +  rt)Ct,  (12) 
C*=  13(1 +  rt)C  *,  (13) 
Mt  [X  t 
I  )  ]it  (14) 
M*  xc(  + i/  ](5  Y,  C  ~~~~~~~(15) 
Yt(Z)(@  =  (  1)Cr1(Cv  +  GW  )"0,  (16) 
Y(+)=  (-1)c*1(CW  + GW)".  (17) 
Equations  (12) and  (13) are standard  consumption  Euler equations. 
The  money  market  equilibrium  conditions  (14) and  (15) equate  the 
marginal  rate of  substitution  of  composite  consumption  for  the  ser- 
vices  of  real  money  balances  to  the  consumption  opportunity  cost 
of  holding  real  balances.  Notice  that  money  demand  depends  on 
consumption  rather  than  on  income,  a distinction  that can be  even 
more  important  in  open  than  in  closed  economies.8  Equations  (16) 
and  (17)  state  that  the  marginal  utility  of  the  additional  revenue 
earned  from  producing  an extra unit of  good  z equals the  marginal 
disutility of the needed  effort. 
8 A role  for  consumption  spending  rather  than  output  in  U.S.  money  demand  re- 
ceives empirical  support  from  Mankiw and Summers  (1986).  In a model with firm and 
government  holdings  of  transactions balances, a broader expenditure  measure  would 
be appropriate  for analyzing  money  demand. EXCHANGE RATE DYNAMICS  631 
C.  A Symmetric  Steady  State 
In  a  steady  state,  all  exogenous  variables  are  constant.9  Since  this 
implies that consumption  is constant, the steady-state world real inter- 
est rate F is tied down  by the consumption  Euler conditions  (12) and 
(13): 
1-13  o.(18) 
In  equation  (18)  and  below,  steady-state  values  are  marked  by 
overbars. 
All producers  in a country  are symmetric,  which implies  that they 
set the same price and output  in equilibrium.  Let p(h) be the home- 
currency price of a typical home  good and p*(f ) the foreign-currency 
price of a typical foreign  good; y and y* are the corresponding  output 
levels.  If composite  consumption  is constant  in both  countries,  then 
each country's intertemporal  budget  constraint requires that real con- 
sumption  spending  be  equal  to  net  real  interest  payments  from 
abroad  plus  real  domestic  output  less  real  government  spending.'0 
Thus  steady-state  per capita consumption  levels are 
C F  +__  - G  (19) 
and 
=  -  +  -G*.  (20) 
(Notice  that eq. [20] makes use of the identity nF  +  [1  -  n]F*  =  0: 
world  net  foreign  assets  must  be  zero.)  We  stress  again  that,  even 
though  people  in different  countries  face the same relative price for 
any  given  good,  the  relative  price  of  home  and  foreign  goods  (the 
terms of trade) can vary. Even the steady-state terms of trade change 
as relative wealth changes  because the marginal benefit from produc- 
tion is declining  in wealth. 
In the  special case of  zero  net  foreign  assets and  equal  per capita 
government  spending  levels,  there  is a closed-form  solution  for  the 
steady state, in which the countries  have identical  per capita outputs 
and  real  money  holdings.  We  shall  denote  by  zero  subscripts 
the particular steady state with both Fo =  F*  =  0 and Go =  G*  =  0; 
9 It is simple to allow for steady-state growth in the money  supplies and other exoge- 
nous  variables. 
'0 It is at this point  that we are imposing  the  countries'  intertemporal  budget  con- 
straints, which rule out  Ponzi schemes  of  unlimited  borrowing. 632  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
in it, 
1/2 
0  A*  (0-1)  (21) 
and 
M  Mo  (1  -15)-l/6  (22) 
Equation (21) is analogous  to the output  equation  in the static closed- 
economy  model of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987): producers' market 
power  pushes  global output  below  its competitive  level,  which is ap- 
proached  only  as 0 -m  oo. Because  this model  is dynamic,  real money 
balances  in  general  depend  on  nominal  interest  rates.  We  have  as- 
sumed  a zero-inflation  steady  state,  so  this  effect  shows  up  in  (22) 
only as an effect  of  the steady-state  value of -r/(l  +  r)  =  1  -  1I. 
D.  A Log-Linearized  Model 
To  go  further  and  allow  for  asymmetries  in  policies  and  current 
accounts,  it is helpful  to  log-linearize  the  model  around  the  initial 
symmetric  steady  state  with F0  =  F*  =  0 and  Go =  Go  =  0.  We 
implement  this linearization by expressing  the model in terms of devi- 
ations  from  the  baseline  steady-state  path.  Denote  percentage 
changes  from  the  baseline  by  hats;  thus,  for  any  variable,  Xk 
dXIX0,  where X0 is the initial steady-state  value. 
The  easiest  equation  to  start with  is the  purchasing  power  parity 
relation  (4), which requires  no approximation: 
A1  A  A 
Et =P-Pt*  (23) 
Given  the  symmetry  among  each  country's  producers,  equation  (3) 
yields 
=  {npt(h)'-0  + (1 -n)Etp*(f)j1-8}1(1-0) 
P*=  {n[  E)]  + (1  -  n)p*(f)' 
I 
Small percentage  deviations of consumer  price levels from their initial 
paths thus are given  by 
Pt =  nA,(h) +  (1  -  n)[Et + Pt(f)]  (24) 
and 
=  n[p  (h) -  Et]  +  (1  -  n)[  "(f)],  (25) EXCHANGE RATE DYNAMICS  633 
where we have used  the fact that at the initial symmetric steady state, 
Iio(h) =  Eo0*(f). 
Next,  take  a  population-weighted  average  of  (5)  and  its  foreign 
counterpart.  Combining  the  result  with  (7) and  (9) gives  the  global 
goods  market equilibrium  condition: 
Cw=  nPt(h)yt]  + (1 -  n)_  p_*  ]  -  Gtw 
Thus  linearizing  implies  that the change  in world private demand  is 
Ct  =nCt+(I-  n)C( 
(26) 
=n[pt(h)  +  ^t  -  P] +(1  -n)[fi*(f)  +  i*-  -  C-] 
Remember  that in the  initial symmetric  steady state, PIo(h)  =  PO  and 
*(f  P*. Remember  also that because world population  is normal- 
ized  at one  and  initial net  foreign  assets and  government  purchases 
are zero,  U  =  CO =  CO*  =  Yo =  Yo* 
The  log-linearized  versions of (8) and its foreign  counterpart,  inter- 
preted  as world  demand  schedules  for typical domestic  and  foreign 
products,  are 
Yt  =  O[Pt -  pt(h)] +  CtW  -  (27) 
and 
dGw 
Yt =  o[Pt  -  Pt*(f)]  +  C^t +  C-  *  (28) 
0 
Equations  (16)  and  (17),  which  describe  the  optimal  flexible-price 
output  levels,  are approximated  by 
dGw 
(0 +  1)yt =  -OCt  +  C^W  +  -  (29) 
and 
dGw' 
(0+ )yt*=O  *  + C~tW  +  t  w  (30) 
0~~~~(0 
The  consumption  Euler equations  (12) and (13) take the log-linear 
form 
Ct+ I =  Ct +  (1  -  a)  ft  (31) 634  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
and 
Ct*+  I  Ct*  +  (G -  *at  (32) 
near the initial steady-state  path. Finally, the money demand equa- 
tions (14) and (15) become 
MA PACI 
A 
jt+  1  -  Pt 
Mt  Pt  et  e  (t  +  (33) 
and 
Mt  t  e  '  e  ( 
E.  Comparing  Steady  States 
To  solve the model, we still need  the intertemporal budget con- 
straints,  which are implicit  in equations  (19) and (20) when the exoge- 
nous variables  are constant. Linearizing  these two equations, and let- 
ting X  dXIX0 denote the percentage change in a steady-state  value, 
yields 
C=F-rF+P(h)+  9  _ p~dG  (35) 
0  co 
and 
C*  -(_)  d  co  (36) 
The  final step in solving for the steady state is to observe that 
equations (26)-(30) hold across  steady  states,  so that they remain  valid 
after time-subscripted  changes are replaced by steady-state  changes. 
Together with (35) and (36), they furnish sevenA  equations in the 
seven unknowns, C, C*, 9,  9*,  P(h) -  P, P*(f)  -  P*, and Cw, which 
we can use to determine the new real steady state. The solutions for 
consumption are" 
-  1+0  (?dF\(  -)n  dG* _I  -n+0\  dG 
20\  V  \  0  V  0-+1  (37) 
" The mechanics  of solving the model are greatly  simplified  by exploiting the sym- 
metry  across  countries.  In particular,  it is very straightforward  to solve for differences 
between  home and foreign variables,  and for population-weighted  sums. The efficacy 
of this  approach  will  be apparent  in Sec. IIIB when we solve for the short-run  exchange 
rate and interest  rate. For a more extended discussion,  see Obstfeld  and Rogoff (1996). EXCHANGE RATE DYNAMICS  635 
and 
C*A  _  n  (1 +  rdF+  ( n)  dG  (n  + 0  )  dG*  (38) 
2  0  v 
Consider  equation  (37) for home  private consumption.  An exoge- 
nous  increase  dF in  home  per  capita  foreign  assets would  increase 
steady-state consumption  by the amount UdF  were output  exogenous. 
Instead,  consumption  increases here by less (since 0 >  1). The  reason 
is  that  higher  wealth  leads  to  some  reduction  in  work  effort  and 
production:  as (29) shows,  higher  consumption  lowers  the  marginal 
utility of consumption  and, thus, marginal revenue  measured  in util- 
ity  units.  We  also  see  from  (37)  that  a  steady-state  rise  in  foreign 
government  consumption  increases  domestic  private  consumption 
because  part of the spending  falls on domestic  output,  which rises in 
response.  When  steady-state  home  government  consumption  rises, 
however,  home  private  consumption  falls. There  is a positive  effect 
on output,  as we shall explain  in a moment,  but it is more than offset 
by a higher  domestic  tax burden.  Positive output  effects  do, however, 
allow private consumptions  to fall by less than the associated  tax in- 
creases. 
To see the effects  of net foreign  assets and fiscal policies on outputs 
and  the  terms  of  trade,  observe  that equations  (24)-(30),  (37),  and 
(38) imply 
__ +  1  2(I  +  _)  C7 
9*  =  1 + 0C  +  [2(I  + 0)  -7w  (40) 
and 
0ih 
(  ) 
=(Y*Y) 
=  +  fi,  (C-C*).  (41) 
Equations  (39) and  (40) show the  multiplier  effects  of  domestic  gov- 
ernment  spending  on  output  emphasized  by  Mankiw  (1988)  and 
Startz  (1989).  Higher  lump-sum  taxes  cause  producers  to  cut  con- 
sumption  but also to work harder. One can show that the net stimulus 
to  aggregate  demand  is  greater  than  under  perfect  competition. 
Equation  (41) shows that the increase  in the domestic  terms of trade 
(the  rise  in  the  relative  price  of  home  products)  is proportional  to 
both  the  increase  in relative foreign  output  and the increase  in rela- 636  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
tive  domestic  consumption.12  Note  that  because  the  infinitely  lived 
citizens in both countries  have equal constant discount rates, an inter- 
national  transfer of assets leads to a permanent  change  in the terms of 
trade.13 
With  flexible  prices,  the  classical invariance  of  the  real  economy 
with  respect  to  monetary  factors  holds  in this model.  Across  steady 
states, inflation  and the interest  rate do not change,  so (33) and  (34) 
imply that 
P=M--C  (42) 
and 
P*  = M*  --C*.  (43) 
E 
III.  The  Two-Country  Model  with  Sticky  Prices 
We are now ready to understand  the short-run behavior of exchange 
rates, the current  account,  and other  key variables. In the short run, 
nominal  producer  prices p(h) and p*(f)  are predetermined;  that is, 
they  are set a period  in advance  but can be adjusted  fully after  one 
period.  We shall not explicitly  model  the underlying  source of sticki- 
ness here, though  one can straightforwardly  reinterpret  all the results 
below  in a setting  with menu  costs of  price adjustment  A la Akerlof 
and  Yellen  (1985a,  1985b), Mankiw (1985),  or Blanchard  and  Kiyo- 
taki (1987).14 
A.  Short-Run  Equilibrium  Conditions 
With preset nominal  prices, output  becomes  demand  determined  for 
small enough  shocks. Because  a monopolist  always prices above mar- 
ginal  cost,  it is profitable  to meet  unexpected  demand  at the  preset 
price.15  In the short run, therefore,  the equations  equating  marginal 
12 This  proportionality  follows  from  the  specific  types of  shocks assumed  and  does 
not  hold  in  general.  Permanent  productivity  shocks,  which  we  shall  mention  later, 
would cause a negative  correlation  between a country's terms of trade and its consump- 
tion. National bias in government  spending  also would modify the simple proportional- 
ity in (41). 
1  In other  types of models-e.g.,  in an overlapping  generations  model-a  transfer 
of  assets  has  only  temporary  effects  since  the  generations  that  receive  the  transfer 
eventually  die out. 
14 One  can potentially  extend  the  model  to incorporate  richer price dynamics,  e.g., 
staggered  price  setting.  Pricing-to-market  issues  (e.g.,  Dornbusch  1987;  Krugman 
1987)  do  not arise here  because  there  are no impediments  to trade. 
15 It would  be more  profitable still to raise the price if this were possible in the short 
run.  If there is an unexpected  fall in demand  and the monopolist  cannot cut the price, 
there  is no choice  but to produce  and sell less. EXCHANGE RATE DYNAMICS  637 
revenue  and  marginal  cost  in  the  flexible-price  case,  (29) and  (30), 
need  not hold.  Instead,  output  is determined  entirely by the demand 
equations,  (27) and  (28). 
Although  prices are preset  in terms of the producers'  own curren- 
cies, the foreign-currency  price of  a producer's  output  must change  if 
the exchange  rate moves.  How do exchange  rate changes  affect  rela- 
tive prices  and  demands  in the  short run? With rigid output  prices, 
equations  (24) and  (25) imply 
P  =  (1-n)E  (44) 
and 
P*  =  -nE.  (45) 
In  (44)  and  (45),  and  henceforth,  we  use  hatted  variables  without 
time  subscripts  or  overbars  to  denote  short-run deviations  from  the 
symmetric steady-state path. Combining  these price changes with (27) 
and  (28) shows that short-run  aggregate  demands  can be expressed 
as 
y =O(l  -n)E  +  Cw  +dG  (46) 
and 
ye =  OnE + CW  +7w  (47) 
0 
where  CW is given  by (26)  and  differentials  without  time  subscripts 
(such as dGw) refer  to short-run  changes.  The  remaining  equations 
of  short-run  equilibrium  include  (31)-(34),  which always hold. 
In the specific policy experiments  we do, where we consider  either 
one-period  (temporary) or permanent  changes  from the baseline pol- 
icies,  the  world  economy  reaches  its new  steady  state after  a single 
period.'6 Thus  we can replace all (t +  1)-subscripted  variables in the 
linearized  consumption-Euler  and  money  demand  equations  (31)- 
(34) with steady-state changes.  All t-subscripted variables in (31)-(34) 
are now interpreted  as short-run  values. 
In the last section,  we solved  for the new steady state as a function 
of the permanent  changes  in money  supplies and government  spend- 
ing, as well as the change  in net foreign  assets (the current  account). 
The  change  in  net  foreign  assets,  however,  is endogenous  and  can 
be determined  only in conjunction  with a full solution  of the model's 
intertemporal  equilibrium. 
16 With more  general  assumptions  on  the  exogenous  variables, the  economy  would 
reach  a (possibly  moving)  flexible-price  equilibrium  after  one  period,  in the  absence 
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In the long  run here,  current accounts are balanced,  as implied  by 
the  steady-state  conditions  (19) and (20).  In the short run, however, 
the home  country's  per capita current-account  surplus  is given  by 
Ft-  Ft-  =  r,-iF,-1  +  -  -Ct-Gt, 
Pt 
and similarly for the foreign  country.  Thus,  since F0 =  0, the linear- 
ized short-run  current-account  equations  are 
dF  =  dG  (48) 
0  0 
and 
dF*  dG*  (  n)  CO 
-Y*  -  C* +  nE  -  -  ~~~~~(49) 
where  we  have  made  use  of  (44)  and  (45).  Note  that  dF  and  dF* 
appear  above  because  the  asset  stocks  at  the  end  of  period  t are 
steady-state  levels. 
B.  Solution of the Model: Money Shocks 
One  can  formally  solve  the  model  in two stages.  The  first stage,  al- 
ready  dealt  with  in  Section  IIE,  is  to  solve  for  all  the  steady-state 
variables (those marked with overbars) as functions  of the steady-state 
macroeconomic  policy shifts and the first-period current account, dF. 
Ten  short-run  variables remain to be determined:  C, C*, 9,S  *, PI P*, 
E,  CW,  r, and  dF. The  10 equations  that jointly  determine  them  are 
(26),  (31)-(34),  and  (44)-(48).  Though  a direct  solution  is possible, 
we prefer  an intuitive  approach  that exploits  the model's  symmetry. 
To  simplify,  we  look  at  monetary  and  fiscal  shocks  separately, 
taking  the  former  first and,  thus,  assuming  temporarily  that dG  = 
dG =  dG*  =  dG*  =  0. Nothing  is lost through  this approach  since 
the effects  are additive. 
1.  Exchange  Rate Dynamics 
Some of the model's main predictions  can be seen by looking  at inter- 
national differences  in macroeconomic  variables. Subtracting the for- 
eign  Euler equation  (32) from  its home  counterpart  (31) gives 
C  -  C* = C -  C*.  (50) EXCHANGE RATE DYNAMICS  639 
A  similar operation  on  the  money  demand  equations  (34)  and  (33) 
leads  to 
(M - M*)  - E  =  C  -  aC*)  -(  g5  (E-E)  (51) 
after  (23)  is used  (eq.  [23]  holds  in  the  short  and  in  the  long  runs 
alike). 
Equation  (50) states that all shocks have  permanent  effects  on  the 
difference  between  home  and foreign  per capita consumption.  Indi- 
viduals  need  not  have  flat consumption  profiles  if  the  real  interest 
rate differs  from  its steady-state  value.  However,  since  real interest 
rates have the same effect  on home  and foreign  consumption  growth, 
relative consumptions  still follow a random  walk. Equation (51) is vir- 
tually  identical  to  the  central  equation  of  the flexible-price  monetary 
model  of exchange  rates, despite  the presence  of sticky prices here.'7 
The  only essential  difference  is that in (51), relative money  demand 
depends  on  consumption  differences,  not  on  output  differences  as 
the  monetary  model  supposes.  In the present  model,  the decision  to 
hold  money  involves  an opportunity  cost that depends  on  the  mar- 
ginal  utility  of  consumption.  A  prediction  that money  demand  de- 
pends on consumption  or expenditure  rather than output is common, 
however,  to many other  intertemporal  monetary  models.'8 
A recognition  that consumption  rather than output  enters  money 
demand  has  potentially  important  empirical  implications,  especially 
in an open  economy  that can smooth its consumption  through  foreign 
borrowing  and  lending.  For example,  transitory output  shocks  that 
induce  permanent  relative consumption  movements  will have perma- 
nent  exchange  rate effects.'9 
Consider  the classic Dornbusch  (1976) exercise of an unanticipated 
permanent  rise in  the  relative  home  money  supply.  To  see  the  ex- 
change  rate  implications  of  equation  (51),  let us first lead  it by one 
period  to obtain 
A  A  A 
E  =  (M-M*)  --  (C -C*), 
E 
}7  See Frenkel  (1976)  and  Mussa (1976)  for discussions  of  the monetary  model. 
18 As noted  above,  Mankiw and  Summers  (1986)  argue  that consumption  expendi- 
ture rather than output  should  enter  empirical  money  demand  models.  They  do not, 
however,  emphasize  the  implications  of  intertemporal  consumption  smoothing  for 
financial  asset prices or the  price level. 
19 Rogoff  (1992)  presents  a model  in which transitory productivity  and government 
spending  shocks can have long-lasting  effects  on the real exchange  rate due  to traded 
goods  consumption  smoothing. 640  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
which  is simpler  than  (51)  because  all variables are constant  in  the 
assumed  steady  state.20 Using  the  expression  above  to  substitute 
for E  in  (51)  and noting  that  C  -  C*  =  C  -  C* by (50)  and  that 
M  -  M*=  M  -  M*  (since the money  supply  shock is permanent), 
we obtain 
E =  (M-M*)-  (C-C*).  (52) 
Thus  E  =  E.  The  exchange  rate jumps  immediately  to its long-run 
level  despite  the  inability  of  prices  to  adjust  in  the  short  run.  The 
intuition  behind  this  result  is apparent  from  equation  (51).  If  con- 
sumption  differentials  and  money  differentials  are both expected  to 
be constant, then agents must expect a constant exchange  rate as well. 
Indeed,  although  we have considered  only permanent  money  sup- 
ply  shocks,  the  random-walk  behavior  of  consumption  differences 
simplifies  the  analysis  of  more  general  shocks.  For  more  general 
money  shock  processes,  the usual forward solution  to (51) is just 
Et =, 
0  +  (1  R)  + (1-  ] 
(53) 
x  (NI3 -Mr)  --(C-  C*). 
The  general  result  here  is that the  exchange  rate jumps  immedi- 
ately to the  flexible-price  path corresponding  to the new permanent 
international  consumption  differential.  This  does  not  mean,  of 
course,  that the  model  behaves  exactly like a flexible-price  model:  in 
a flexible-price  model  there  would  be no consumption  effect.  Here, 
in contrast, the exchange  rate change  and the consumption  effect  are 
jointly  determined. 
2.  A Graphical Solution  for the Exchange  Rate 
A simple diagram  (fig.  1) illustrates this interdependence  for perma- 
nent money shocks (M -  M*  =  M  -  M*). The  MM schedule  graphs 
equation  (52), which shows how relative consumption  changes  affect 
the  exchange  rate by changing  relative money  demand.  (Remember 
that the consumption  Euler equations  therefore  are built into  MM.) 
The  MM schedule's  vertical intercept  equals the  relative  percentage 
increase  in the  home  money  supply,  and the  schedule  slopes  down- 
ward because  relative  domestic  money  demand  rises as relative  do- 
20 Implicitly,  we are assuming  away speculative  exchange  rate bubbles. EXCHANGE  RATE  DYNAMICS  641 
Percent  change  in 
exchange  rate,  E 
G 
M't 
/r(1  + 0) + 20 
Slope  =  (2  1) 
M 
\  /  ~M' 
Percent  change  in relative 
domestic  consumption,  C - C* 
Slope  -1/1  \ 
M 
FIG. 1.-An  unanticipated  permanent relative  domestic money supply increase 
mestic  consumption  rises.  Prior to the  monetary  shock,  the  relevant 
MM schedule  passes through  the origin. 
A second  schedule  in E and C -  CA*  is derived by using the current- 
account equations  (48) and (49) together  with the long-run  consump- 
tion equations  (37) and (38) to write the long-run  consumption  differ- 
ence  as 
C-C*  =  s [(-9*(C  -  C*) -  E ].  20  - 
Equations  (46)  and  (47)  show  that  domestic  output  rises  relative  to 
foreign  output  as the  domestic  currency  depreciates  and  makes  do- 
mestic products  cheaper  in the  short run: 9 -  y*  =  OJ. Combining 
this equation  with  the  one  preceding  it and  with  the  relative  Euler 642  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
equation  (50), we arrive at the GG schedule: 
E =  r~l  +20) + 
2(C  -  C*).  (54) 
This  relationship  shows  the  domestic  currency  depreciation  needed 
to  raise  relative  home  output  enough  to justify  a given  permanent 
rise in relative home  consumption;  it therefore  is upward  sloping. 
Figure  1  shows  the  shift  of  the  initial  MM  schedule  to  M'M' 
that occurs  when  there  is a permanent  unanticipated  relative  home 
money  supply  shock of  size MA  -  MA?*.  The  intersection  of M' M' and 
GG is the short-run  equilibrium.  The  domestic  currency depreciates, 
but  by  an  amount  proportionally  smaller  than  the  increase  in  the 
relative  home  money  supply.  Since E  =  E,  this is true  in  the  long 
run as well.21 
The  exchange  rate rises less than the relative domestic  money  sup- 
ply  because,  as  figure  1 also  shows,  domestic  relative  consumption 
must rise. With nominal  prices fixed  in the short run, the initial cur- 
rency depreciation  switches world demand  toward domestic  products 
and causes a short-run  rise in relative domestic  income.22 Home  resi- 
dents  save  part of  this extra  income:  by running  a current-account 
surplus,  they  smooth  the increase  in their relative consumption  over 
the  future. 
The  exchange  rate change  is smaller the less monopoly  power pro- 
ducers  have, that is, the larger is the price elasticity of demand,  0. As 
0  >  -  and  a perfectly  competitive  economy  is approached,  GG be- 
comes  horizontal  and the exchange  rate effects  of monetary  changes 
disappear.  If  domestic  and  foreign  goods  are  perfect  substitutes  in 
demand  and  their nominal  prices are fixed,  there  is no scope  for an 
exchange  rate change.23 
This diagrammatic  analysis extends  easily to the case of temporary 
money  shocks.  The  MM equation  (52)  is replaced  by (53),  and  the 
GG equation  continues  to hold  for  the initial period.  Thus  the  new 
MM schedule's  slope  is unchanged  but its intercept  is the discounted 
sum of  future  monetary  changes  from  (53). The  effects  of  a tempo- 
21 Figure 1 presents  an interesting  parallel  with  the textbook  diagram  of the Mundell- 
Fleming model that places the exchange rate on the vertical  axis and output on the 
horizontal axis (see, e.g., Dornbusch 1980; Krugman  and Obstfeld 1994). The MM 
schedule is analogous  to the Mundell-Fleming  model's  LM schedule,  and GG is analo- 
gous to its IS schedule. The similarity  between this model's results and those of the 
Mundell-Fleming  model is, however, superficial  and partial,  as we discuss  below. 
22 The increase in relative domestic real income is .  -  S* -  A =  (0 -  I)t  >  0. 
Because  demand has been assumed to be relatively  elastic  (0 >  1), a country's  revenue 
rises when it sells more because of a fall in its products'  prices. 
23 Stockman  and Ohanian  (1993) highlight  this possibility  in a model in which  perfect 
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rary  money  supply  shock  on  both  the  exchange  rate  and  current 
account  are  smaller  than  those  of  a permanent  shock.  The  level  of 
C  -  C* determined  by the diagram  is still permanent,  but equation 
(53)  must  be  used  to  calculate  the  exchange  rate's  path  after  the 
initial, sticky-price period. 
3.  The  Current  Account,  the Terms  of Trade,  and 
World  Interest  Rates 
More can be learned  by algebraically solving  the  model,  as we illus- 
trate using the example  of a permanent  money  shock. Together,  (52) 
and  (54) imply that the exchange  rate change  is 
E=-  E[r(1+O)+20]  (M-M*)  M-  M*,  (55) 
E  (02  -  1) +  E[r(l  +  0) +  20] 
and the relative consumption  change  is 
C-C* 
= 
i-(02  -  1) +  E[r(1 +  0) +  20] (M -  M*)*  (56) 
To  find the equilibrium  current account, we combine  (37) and (38) 
to solve  for C  -  C* as a function  of  dF/Co;  then  we note  that C  - 
C*=  C -  C* by (50) and,  finally, use equation  (56) to obtain 
dE  20E(l  -  n)(0  -  1)  (M-M)A(7 
-  r (0-1)  +  e[F(l  +  0) +  20] 
We  see  from  equation  (57)  that  the  larger  the  home  country  (the 
greater  n), the less the positive  impact of  a home  money  increase on 
its current  account.  Armed  with the  derivative  dF/C"W,  we can solve 
for  all  the  steady-state  values.  For  example,  the  long-run  terms  of 
trade are found  by combining  (57) with (37),  (38), and  (41):24 
P(h) -P*(f  )-E  =  2  r(-1)  (M -  M*)  (58) 
A positive  home  money  shock generates  a long-run  improvement  in 
the  home  terms  of  trade  because  it leads  to  an  increase  in  wealth. 
With higher  long-run  wealth,  home  residents  choose  to enjoy  more 
leisure  (the opposite  happens  abroad): a rise in relative home  output 
24 Note  that both the short-run  and the long-run  terms-of-trade  effects  are indepn- 
dent of relative country size. A country's size determines  the global impact of its policies, 
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prices  results.  In  the  short  run,  of  course,  nominal  domestic  goods 
prices are fixed,  and the home  terms of trade deteriorate  by E. Thus 
the short-run  and  the long-run  terms-of-trade  effects  go in opposite 
directions.  Intuitively,  one  would  expect  the  short-run  effect  to  be 
larger in absolute value; in the long run, it is only the interest income 
on dF/C?"  that is driving the substitution from work effort into leisure. 
Comparing  equation  (55) with equation  (58), we see that this indeed 
is the case. 
The  possibility that money shocks may have long-lasting  real effects 
would  seem  to  be  quite  general,  and  not  simply  an  artifact  of  this 
particular model.  As long as there exists any type of short-run  nomi- 
nal rigidities, unanticipated  money shocks are likely to lead to interna- 
tional capital flows. The  resulting  transfers will extend  the real effects 
of the shock beyond  the initial sticky-price time horizon.  In our infi- 
nitely  lived  agent  model  with  intertemporally  separable  utility,  the 
real effects  are permanent;  but in an overlapping  generations  setting, 
the  effects  should  still last much  longer  than,  say, the  year  or  two 
horizon  of  a typical nominal  wage  contract.  Of course,  one  must be 
careful not to overstate the importance  of the long-run  terms-of-trade 
effects since, as we have shown, they are in general an order of magni- 
tude  smaller  than the short-run  terms-of-trade  effects. 
One  can ask whether  Dornbusch  (1976)  type  exchange  rate over- 
shooting  occurs  here,  although  the issue  is complicated  by the long- 
run  nonneutrality  of  money.  The  more  interesting  question  is 
whether  sticky  prices  lead  to  more  or  less  exchange  rate  volatility 
than one  would  observe  in a world  of  flexible  prices.  In the  present 
model,  preset  prices  actually  reduce exchange  rate  volatility  due  to 
monetary  shocks.  The  fact that the  inflating  country  experiences  an 
improvement  in  its  long-run  terms  of  trade  tempers  the  need  for 
initial  nominal  depreciation.  In  the  Appendix  we  present  a  model 
with  sticky-price  nontraded  consumption  goods  in  which  a  Dorn- 
busch overshooting  result can hold.  Given the lack of empirical  sup- 
port for  the overshooting  hypothesis,  however,  it is unclear  that this 
should  be  regarded  as  an  essential  property  of  an  exchange  rate 
model.25 
It  is  straightforward  to  solve  for  the  remaining  variables  in  the 
model.  To  see how an unanticipated  permanent  monetary  expansion 
affects  the  world  real  interest  rate,  for  example,  use  the  short-run 
price  equations  (44)  and  (45)  and  the  long-run  equations  (42)  and 
(43)  to  express  the  money  market  equilibrium  conditions  (33)  and 
25 One  empirical  regularity  apparently  inconsistent  with  overshooting  is  the  well- 
documented  tendency  for  spot  and  forward  exchange  rates to move  in tandem  (see, 
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(34) as 
(t  +  t  (-  +  M_  [M-(1-n)E]  =  r^ 
and 
C  +  (1  -  +  1 _  )(M*  +nE)  =o. 
Multiply the first of these expressions  by n^,  the second  bay  1  -  n, and 
add.  Because,  by  (37)  and  (38),  CW =  nC  +  (1  -  n)C*  =  0  for  a 
pure monetary  shock, the consumption  Euler equations  (31) and (32) 
imply that 
C=  nC +  (I1-n)C*  =-(I1-  )r  (59) 
in the short run,  and so 
r=  f(  + 1  _  )RM,  (60) 
where 
MW  nM +  (1-  n)M*. 
A monetary  expansion  either  at home  or abroad lowers the world 
real interest  rate in proportion  to the  increase  in the  "world money 
supply" MW and,  thus,  raises  global  consumption  demand.  The  li- 
quidity  effect  is greater  the higher  is e,  which  is inversely  related  to 
the  interest  elasticity of  money  demand.  Relatively  interest  inelastic 
money  demand  (a high value of e) means that a monetary  expansion 
will cause  a proportionally  large  decline  in the  real interest  rate. As 
in equation  (18), there  is no effect  on the long-run  real interest  rate, 
which  is tied to the rate of  time preference. 
What about the nominal  interest rate? One can show that a perma- 
nent  monetary  expansion  in either  country  lowers  nominal  interest 
rates  worldwide  provided  e  >  1.  (This  probably  is  the  empirically 
relevant  case.) 
While a monetary  expansion  raises global demand  in the short run 
by  lowering  the  world  real  interest  rate,  it  has  asymmetric  output 
effects  in the  two countries  if the exchange  rate changes.  Equations 
(46) and (47) show the short-run output changes.  Consider the effects 
of  a unilateral  increase  in the  home  money  supply.  The  world  real 
interest  rate falls and world  demand  rises, but because  the domestic 
currency  depreciates  (E >  0), some  world demand  is shifted  toward 
home  products  at foreign  producers' expense.  As a result, home  out- 646  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
put rises relatively more;  in fact, foreign  output  actually can fall.26 A 
similar ambiguity  is familiar from  two-country  versions  of  the  Mun- 
dell-Fleming-Dornbusch  model.27 
C.  Welfare  Analysis of International 
Monetary Transmission 
On  a  superficial  reading,  the  preceding  analysis  suggests  that  the 
effects  of  a home  monetary  expansion  on  foreign  welfare  easily can 
be negative.  In the long run, foreign  agents work harder but, because 
of foreign  debt and a deterioration  in their terms of trade, consume 
less. Moreover,  foreign  output  may fall in the short run. But even  in 
that case there are some short-run  benefits for foreigners:  they enjoy 
more leisure, improved  terms of trade, and consumption  higher  than 
income.  The  advantage  of  our  dynamic  utility-theoretic  approach  is 
that the overall welfare  effect  of  these  opposing  forces  can be rigor- 
ously  evaluated.  As in Section  IIIB,  monetary  changes  are assumed 
permanent. 
We divide the problem of evaluating welfare changes  into two parts 
by writing  the  intertemporal  utility function  (6) as  U  =  UR  +  UM, 
where  UR consists of  the terms depending  on consumption  and out- 
put and  UM  consists of the terms depending  on real money  balances. 
Consider the change in UR first. Since the economy  reaches a steady 
state after  one  period,  the  change  in a home  resident's  lifetime  wel- 
fare due  to consumption  and output  changes  is 
dUR=  C  oy  +  (C  -  Kyo9)- 
Equation  (21) and the assumption  that C0 =  yo =  C0w  show that this 
equation  can be rewritten  as 
dUR=C~(  +  I-[  (0- H  (61) 
26 To  solve  for 5*, combine  eqq.  (47),  (55),  (59),  and  (60).  If  e  =  1, the  resulting 
expression  simplifies  to 
j*  =2n(I  -  )  M +  (I  +  0) +  2 (I1-n  +  En) M*, 
so that, in this special case, the effect of home monetary expansion  on short-run foreign 
output  is unambiguously  negative.  One  can  show,  however,  that as e  gets  large,  the 
effect  of  home  money  on  foreign  output  becomes  positive. 
27 See, e.g.,  Canzoneri and Henderson  (1991), who discuss the importance of interna- 
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Equation  (46)  shows  the  value  of 9; C's value  follows  from  (55), 
(56),  and  (59) as 
7(1 +  0) +  20E 
The  long-run  home  consumption  change  C can be derived  from (37), 
(55), and  (57): 
7(1 -n)  (02  -1)^ 
T(I +  0) +  20 
(39) shows  that the long-run  home  output  change  is 
_n  70 (I-n)  (O-  1) E 
Y  7(1 +  0) +  20 
The  corresponding  foreign  variables are obtained  by replacing  1  - 
n with  -  n in the exchange  rate coefficients  of these expressions.  Thus 
all asymmetric effects  of the monetary  shock are transmitted  through 
the exchange  rate. 
Returning  to (61), we see from  the preceding  equations  and equa- 
tion (18) that the impact of the exchange  rate terms on home  welfare 
is zero, leaving 
dUR_  C  -  P+E(1-i3)MW  (62) 
0  0 
This  change  is the  product  of  the  aggregate  demand  level  change, 
dCw,  and the initial (positive) difference  between  the marginal utility 
of  consumption  and  the  marginal  cost in utility terms  of  producing 
consumer  goods.  The  obvious  symmetry of the preceding  calculation 
shows that, for the  foreign  country  as well, 
dU*R=  C  -  P+E(14  M) W  (63) 
0  0 
Thus  the  only  effect  of  the  money  shock  on  UR and  U*R  comes 
from  the general  increase  in world demand  in the initial period,  and 
both  countries  share  the  benefits  equally.  This  is  true  despite  the 
permanent  increase  in  home  relative  consumption  caused  by  the 
shock. 
The  fact that unanticipated  monetary  expansion  can raise welfare 
is  familiar  from  the  static closed-economy  analyses  of  Akerlof  and 
Yellen  (1985a,  1985b) and  Blanchard  and  Kiyotaki (1987).  Because 
price exceeds  marginal cost in a monopolistic  equilibrium,  aggregate 
demand  policies  that coordinate  higher  work effort  move  the  econ- 
omy  closer  to efficient  production,  with a first-order  impact  on  wel- 648  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
fare. The  surprising  result in (62) and (63) is that the terms-of-trade 
and  current-account  effects  that  accompany  unilateral  monetary 
changes-effects  long central to the international  policy coordination 
literature-are  of  strictly  second-order  importance  here.  How  can 
this be? 
The  crux of the matter is that if home  producers  lower prices and 
produce  more,  they gain revenue  but work harder  to get it. Starting 
in the initial equilibrium,  where marginal revenue  and cost are equal, 
the  utility effects  cancel  exactly.  An  unexpected  home-currency  de- 
preciation, which lowers the real price of home goods when domestic- 
money  prices  are  sticky,  has  the  same  effect:  home  producers  sell 
more but work harder too. Foreign producers  face the opposite  situa- 
tion. The  first-order effect  of the monetary expansion  thus is to raise 
global aggregate  demand  and world output.  The  associated expendi- 
ture-switching  effects  are only second-order.  Does the fact that a cur- 
rent-account  imbalance arises upset this conclusion?  No.  Here,  at the 
margin,  all effects  from  reallocating  consumption  and  leisure  over 
time have to be second-order  as well. 
Obviously, our result holds in its extreme  form only for small mon- 
etary  expansions.  For large  shifts,  the  envelope  theorem  no  longer 
applies and assessments of welfare outcomes  require numerical  meth- 
ods.  Nevertheless,  our  analysis suggests  that, even  in cases in which 
the  conventional  Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch  paradigm  yields  em- 
pirically  sensible  results,  its  ostensible  welfare  implications  can  be 
quite  misleading.  For example,  the earlier models  may overstate  the 
importance  of  the  "beggar-thy-neighbor"  effects  that  a country  in- 
flicts on trading  partners when  it depreciates  its currency.  Our theo- 
retical analysis provides  support  for Eichengreen  and Sachs's (1985) 
and Eichengreen's  (1992)  contention  that, during  the Great Depres- 
sion, the global aggregate-demand  benefits  of  unilateral  inflationary 
devaluations  were at least as important  as the expenditure-switching 
effects.28 
A  crucial  assumption  underlying  the  model's  welfare  prediction 
is that  producers'  market  power  is the  only  distortion  in the  initial 
equilibrium.  Home  monetary  expansion  would  not  necessarily  raise 
welfare  in,  say, a foreign  economy  with involuntary  unemployment 
due  to an efficiency-wage  mechanism. 
Our  symmetrical  international  transmission  result can similarly be 
reversed  when  distorting  income  taxes discourage  labor effort.  Sup- 
28  Embedded in our results is the assumption  that initially  there is no net interna- 
tional  debt. If such debt were present, the fall in the interest  rate  caused by a monetary 
expansion would cause a first-order  income redistribution  from the creditor country 
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pose,  for example,  that income  from labor is taxed in both countries 
at rate  T, with  the  proceeds  being  remitted  to  the  private  sector  in 
lump-sum  fashion.  In this case, the expenditure-switching  effect  of a 
currency  depreciation  allows the home  country to achieve an ex post 
reduction  in  its tax  distortion  at foreign  expense.  This  can be  seen 
by  inspecting  the  welfare  effects  of  monetary  changes  in  this  case, 
which are 
dUR  [I  (o_ 
+I1 
n  (1 +  T)  (O  ) 
d  =  +  T\  0  ']  +  T(I  - n  (1  + 0) + 20 
and 
dU*R  I  0  I  ^W 
( 
+  T(  f[.(  )+2 -]E. 
[e  ( 
T 
)]C  Tn-(  )(  )E. 
These  expressions  show  that the  tax distortion  T  enhances  the  gain 
both countries  potentially  derive  from an unanticipated  rise in world 
aggregate  demand  (compare  with [62] and  [63]) but that the accom- 
panying exchange  rate change redistributes the overall benefit toward 
the depreciating  country. 
Which  distortions  are  likely  to  dominate?  One  cannot  draw  any 
concrete  conclusions  without  empirical  analysis.  We  note,  however, 
that  the  monopoly  effects  emphasized  in  our  model  have  figured 
prominently  in  a  number  of  recent  attempts  to  explain  the  main 
features  of  business  cycles  (see,  e.g.,  Hall  1986;  Rotemberg  and 
Woodford  1992).  What  our  analysis  clearly  does  show  is  that  the 
intermediate  policy targets typically emphasized  in earlier Keynesian 
models-for  example,  output,  the  terms  of  trade,  and  the  current 
account-can  easily point  in the wrong  direction. 
Thus  far we have not discussed  real-balance effects,  which change 
UM and  U*M, but they  should  not  reverse  our  conclusions.  Because 
the marginal utility of money  is positive, policies that raise real mone- 
tary balances  can  be  Pareto  improving.  In  the  case  of  a  unilateral 
home  monetary  expansion,  home  real  balances  rise  in  all  periods. 
Foreign  real balances,  however,  rise in the first period  but fall in the 
long  run because  long-run  foreign  consumption  falls. The  net effect 
abroad is ambiguous.  But unless  X in (6) is implausibly  large, so that 
real balances have a high weight in total welfare relative to consump- 
tion,  the aggregate  demand  effects  captured  in (62) and (63) are the 
dominant  ones.29 
29 It  can  be  shown  that,  for  empirically  reasonable  parameter  values,  dU*M >  0. 
As  we  observed  in  n.  3,  no  such  parameter  restrictions  need  to  be  invoked  in  the 
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D.  Government  Spending Shocks 
A government's  spending  falls on both home  and foreign  goods,  but 
the  taxes that finance  it are borne  entirely  by its own citizens.  Their 
consumption  falls, but because  they reduce  their leisure  at the same 
time, the net effect  on world aggregate  demand  is positive.  We have 
already  studied  government  spending  under  flexible  prices  (in Sec. 
IIE);  now  we  turn  to the  sticky-price case,  in which  the  results  can 
be surprisingly  different.  Again  we draw on the log-linearized  equa- 
tions  of  Sections  IID,  IIE,_and  IIIA,  abstracting  from  monetary 
changes  by assuming  M  =  M  =  M*  =  M*  =  0. 
The  solution  approach  is completely  parallel  to the  one  followed 
in Section  IIIB.  In  particular,  the  MM schedule  for  this case  is still 
given by equation  (52), but with monetary changes  set to zero. Instead 
of  (54), the equation 
A  _(l  + 0) + 20  A*  dG -  dG*  +  1  dG  dG* 
E  r(02  -  1)  (C  C*) +  Kw1  L  ?7tr  w 
describes  the  new GG schedule,  G'G'.  The  latter has the same posi- 
tive  slope  as before,  but  its vertical intercept  is proportional  to  the 
present  discounted  value  of  differential  government  spending 
changes.  (Recall that dG and dG* are the first-period  fiscal shifts, and 
dG and dG* are the shifts in all subsequent  periods.) 
Figure  2 illustrates  a permanent  unilateral  increase  in home  gov- 
ernment  spending,  with dG =  dG (in the case of a temporary  change, 
the exchange  rate and relative consumption  effects  would be muted). 
Home  consumption  falls relative to foreign  consumption  because do- 
mestic  residents  are  paying  for  the  government  spending.  Because 
this  relative  consumption  change  lowers  the  relative  demand  for 
home  money,  E  rises  (a depreciation  of  home  currency  relative  to 
foreign).30  As  in  our  analysis  of  monetary  disturbances  above,  the 
exchange  rate moves  immediately  to its new steady state, that is, E  = 
E.  This  result  does  not  require  that the  fiscal shock  be  permanent. 
Because  individuals  smooth  consumption  over time, even  temporary 
fiscal shifts induce  a random  walk in the exchange  rate. 
To  derive  algebraic  solutions  for  the model,  one  proceeds  exactly 
as in the case of money shocks. (To simplify the resulting expressions, 
we hold G* at zero when  this is convenient.)  The  short-run  exchange 
rate change  is 
A  r~~~(l  + 0)  rdG  I1  dG  E =  +-  _ 
r  1) +  E[F(l +  0) +  20]  cC  CO 
'? Remember  that  in  the  fiscal policy  experiment  we  are  considering,  relative  de- 
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FIG. 2.-An  unanticipated  permanent  increase  in home government  spending 
By equation  (52), C -C*  =  -4E.  The  current  account is given by 
dF  T(I + 0) (I -n) (e +  - 1) 
?7w  7(02 -1)  +  E[T(1 +  0) +  20] 
x  [dG  +  (1)dG]  (1  n)dG  (64) 
In  the  case  of  a  transitory  spending  increase  (dG  =  0),  it is clear 
that the home  country  runs a current-account  deficit. The  dominant 
mechanism  is  similar  to  that  in  flexible-price  models:  because  the 
tax  increase  is  temporary,  consumption  falls  by  less  than  the  rise 
in  government  spending.  There  is a partially offsetting  effect  here, 
however,  because  the home-currency  depreciation  causes a short-run 652  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
rise in  home  relative  to  foreign  output.  In  fact,  for  a permanent in- 
crease in domestic  government  spending,  equation  (64) implies  that 
the  home  country  runs  a  surplus  if  0  +  1  >  E. The  usual  result 
in  flexible-price,  representative-agent  economies  is that  permanent 
government  spending  changes  have  no  current-account  effects  be- 
cause  they do  not  tilt the  time  profile  of  output  net  of  government 
expenditure.3" With sticky prices, however,  an unanticipated  perma- 
nent rise in G can tilt the time profile of output,  producing  a surplus 
or deficit. 
The  effects  of government  spending  on the world real interest rate 
provide an even more surprising  contrast with the flexible-price  case. 
Allowing once  again for foreign  government  spending,  one  finds the 
short-run  change  in the world real interest  rate to be 
-L3  7  e  -1P  ) 
I  dGW 
L= 
- 
0  (-  ME  co  (65) 
The  startling  implication  of  equation  (65)  is  that  only  innovations 
in future government  spending  affect  the  real interest  rate. Current 
temporary  innovations  in government  spending  have no effect.  With 
sticky prices and demand-determined  output,  global output  rises by 
the  same  amount  as government  spending,  so there  is no change  in 
the  time  path of  output  available for  private consumption  when  the 
government  spending  increase is temporary.  Equation (65) also shows 
that  permanently  higher  government  spending  temporarily  lowers 
the real interest  rate. This  contrasts  with the  textbook  flexible-price 
result of an unchanged  interest  rate (Barro  1993).  Because  an unex- 
pected  permanent  rise in  government  spending  generates  a bigger 
output  effect  in  the  short  run  than  in  the  long  run,  it results  in  a 
declining  path of output  available for private consumption. 
Obviously,  some  of  the  precise  positive  implications  of  our  model 
depend  on  the  exact  manner  in which  government  spending  enters 
it. The  standard  intertemporal  approach  admits a plethora  of  possi- 
bilities  (government  purchases  can be used  for  investment,  govern- 
ment  consumption  can be a substitute for private consumption,  etc.). 
One  result likely to be fairly robust to changes  in the specific details 
of the model,  however,  is that unanticipated  increases in government 
spending  do not raise interest  rates as much  (or lower them more) in 
31 The  result just  mentioned  does  not  generally  hold  in  flexible-price  economies 
with  domestic  investment.  A  permanent  increase  in  government  consumption  may 
permanently  reduce leisure,  thus raising the long-run  home  stock of capital. The  result 
is a rise in investment  accompanied  by a deficit in the current  account.  Baxter  (1992) 
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a world with short-run  price rigidities as in a world with fully flexible 
prices.32 
As was the case for monetary  shocks, nominal  exchange  rates may 
be less volatile under  sticky prices than under  flexible  prices. A con- 
sequence  of  equations  (42),  (43),  and  (23) is that the  MM equation, 
E =  -  /E)(C  -  C*), holds in both the sticky-price and flexible-price 
cases  for  any fiscal shock  (with money  held  constant).  Thus  the  ex- 
change  rate  impact  of  fiscal  policy  is  proportional  to  the  induced 
consumption  differential  regardless  of  whether  prices  are  sticky or 
flexible.  But  from  our  preceding  discussion  of  the  current  account, 
one  can  readily  confirm  that both  temporary  and  permanent  fiscal 
shocks  have  smaller  absolute  effects  on  relative consumption  under 
sticky prices.  Hence,  the  absolute  exchange  rate effects  are  smaller 
as well. 
An explicit welfare analysis of fiscal policy along the lines of Section 
IIIC  is  straightforward.  Again,  the  induced  expenditure  switching 
effects  are  of  second-order  significance.  The  major  new  issue  that 
arises is that the citizens  whose  government  expands  foot  the entire 
tax bill for the resulting  expansion  in world aggregate  demand. 
In  concluding  this  section,  we  note  that  our  analysis,  which  has 
focused  entirely  on  monetary  and  fiscal policy  shocks,  can  easily be 
extended  to  incorporate  productivity  shocks.  They  can be  modeled 
as  changes  in  the  parameter  K  in  equation  (6);  a  fall  in  K  can  be 
interpreted  as implying  that less labor is required  to produce  a given 
amount  of output.  When  K can vary, equations  (29) and (30) become 
^WdGw' 
(0 +  1)9  =  -OCt  +  C  +  _  -0K  t 
and 
dGw 
(O+  1)  -OC+Cw+  _W  +  K 
all the other  equations  of  the linearized  model  remain  the same.33 
32  Our  results  on  the  interest  rate  effects  of  fiscal  policies,  which  apply  equally 
to closed-  and  open-economy  sticky-price  models,  appear  to be  new.  Mankiw (1987) 
shows that when durables as well as capital accumulation  are present in a flexible-price 
model,  higher  government  spending  may temporarily  lower the real interest  rate. 
33 Since the supply equations,  (29) and (30), are not binding  in the sticky-price short 
run,  the  output  effects  of  purely  temporary  unanticipated  fluctuations  in  K are offset 
entirely by fluctuations  in leisure.  No other variables need  adjust. In contrast, a perma- 
nent unanticipated  fall  in  home  K  (a  rise  in  home  productivity)  causes  a  short-run 
improvement  in the  home  terms  of  trade,  a long-run  deterioration,  and  a short-run 
increase  in the  world real interest  rate. 654  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
IV.  Extensions 
To highlight  both the potential and the limitations of our framework, 
we briefly catalog a number  of possible extensions.34 Just as there are 
many  variants of  the  Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch  model  that allow 
for  intermediate  goods,  nontraded  goods,  international  differences 
in wage setting, and so on, one can imagine  numerous  variants of the 
present  model.  In the Appendix,  we develop  a small-open-economy 
variant that allows for nontraded  consumption  goods.  This  model  is 
much  simpler  to solve  than  the  two-country  model  explored  above. 
An  extended  general  equilibrium  version  must  be  used  to  address 
international  transmission  issues. 
Our  analysis  has not  allowed  for  uncertainty  except  for  one-time 
unanticipated  shocks.  However,  standard  techniques  can be used  to 
develop  a stochastic  version  of  the  model.35 A  further  limitation  is 
our  treatment  of  monetary  policy  as  exogenous.  But  the  fact  that 
unanticipated  monetary  policy expansion  raises welfare  implies  that 
credibility  problems  can  arise in  a model  in which  monetary  policy 
is  determined  endogenously.  Using  the  model  to  look  at  inflation 
credibility issues as well as problems of international  monetary  policy 
coordination  would  seem  a fruitful  area for further  research.36 
The  model's dynamics can be extended  in a number of dimensions. 
Introducing  overlapping  generations  in place of  homogeneous  infi- 
nitely lived  agents  would  enrich  the  dynamics  while  permitting  real 
effects  of government  budget  deficits. The  analysis above considered 
only  one-period  nominal  rigidities,  but allowing  for richer  price dy- 
namics would enhance  the model's empirical applicability. The  exclu- 
sion of domestic  investment,  while a useful strategic simplification for 
some  purposes,  prevents  discussion  of some important  business cycle 
regularities. 
Attempts  to extend  the  framework  clearly become  much  easier if 
one  is  willing  to  settle  for  numerical  results  rather  than  analytical 
ones.  For many  purposes  (such as analyzing  large  shocks),  resort  to 
numerical  methods  is a necessary compromise.  We believe,  however, 
that analytical results  such  as those  presented  here  are a vital aid to 
intuition,  even  intuition  about more  elaborate  numerical  models. 
>  Several  of the extensions discussed  below, including  the cash-in-advance  model of 
money demand and applications  to monetary  policy credibility,  are taken up in Obst- 
feld and Rogoff (1996, chaps. 9, 10). 
3  Explicitly  introducing  uncertainty  would raise  the question  of international  diversi- 
fication of country-specific  risks. In Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), we argue that the 
assumption  made here-that  risk-free  bonds are the only assets countries  trade-is  a 
closer approximation to  reality than  the  alternative extreme of  complete state- 
contingent markets.  Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, chap. 6) consider intermediate  cases 
in which the degree of capital  market  completeness  is endogenously determined. 
36  Romer's  (1993) related static  model focuses on the credibility  of monetary  policy. EXCHANGE RATE DYNAMICS  655 
V.  Conclusions 
We  have  developed  a  framework  that  offers  new  foundations  for 
thinking  about  some  of  the  fundamental  problems  in international 
finance.  Existing models,  whether  traditional static Keynesian models 
or newer  flexible-price  intertemporal  models,  are too  incomplete  to 
offer  a satisfactory  integrative  treatment  of  exchange  rates, output, 
and  the  current  account.  While  our  model  is seemingly  quite  com- 
plex,  it yields  simple  and  intuitive  insights  into  the  international  re- 
percussions  of  monetary  and  fiscal policies.  It can be  extended  in a 
number  of  dimensions,  including  the  addition  of  nontraded  goods, 
pricing to market behavior,  home bias in government  spending,  labor 
market distortions,  and so on. 
By design,  our  model  inherits  much  of the empirical  sensibility of 
the still-dominant  Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch  approach  to interna- 
tional finance.  We have gone  beyond  that essentially  static approach 
in offering  a framework  that simultaneously  handles current-account 
and  exchange  rate  issues,  as well  as  the  dynamic  repercussions  of 
fiscal shifts. Most important,  though,  the new approach allows one  to 
analyze meaningfully  the welfare  implications  of alternative  policies. 
We find  that some  of  the  intermediate  policy targets emphasized  in 
earlier  Keynesian  models  of  policy transmission  (the terms of  trade, 
the current  account,  and so on) turn out,  on closer inspection,  to be 
important  individually but largely offsetting  taken jointly.  This would 
never  be apparent  without  carefully  articulated  microfoundations. 
Appendix 
A Model with Nontraded Goods 
Here we sketch a simple model of a small open economy with nontraded 
consumption  goods in which  exchange rate overshooting  is possible.  Now, the 
nontraded-goods sector is monopolistically  competitive  with preset nominal 
prices, but there is a single homogeneous tradable good that sells for the 
same price all over the world. The tradables  sector is perfectly competitive, 
and therefore the money price of the tradable  good is flexible.  A home citizen 
is endowed with a constant  quantity  of the traded good each period,  5T,  and 
has a monopoly over production of one of the nontradables  z E  [0, 1]. 
The utility function of the representative  producer is 
Ut  =  EI  Et  [YlogCTs  +  (1  -  y)logCNs  +  1  -  KYNs(Z)2], 
where CT  is consumption  of the traded good and CN  is composite nontraded 
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0/(O -  1) 
CN  [j?  CN(Z)('  )dz] 
Here,  P is the utility-based  nominal  price index: 
P  =(1  (Al) 
with PT  =  EP*  the nominal  price of the traded good  and P*  exogenous  and 
constant.  The  nominal  price PN is the nontraded  goods  price index 
I  - ~~~1/(1  -0) 
PN  [OPN(Z)  Odz] 
with PN(Z)  the  money  price of  good  z. Bonds  are denominated  in tradables, 
and  the  individual's  period  budget  constraint,  with r denoting  the  constant 
world interest  rate in tradables, is 
PTtFt  +  Mt  =  PTt(l  +  r)Ft-1  +  Mt-1  +  PNt(Z)YN:(Z) 
+  PTtYT 
-  PNtCNt 
-  PTtCTt  -PtTt 
where  per capita taxes T are also denominated  in tradables. It is convenient 
to  assume  that  there  is  no  government  spending,  so  that  the  government 
budget  constraint  is given  by 
=  T  +  Mt-Mt-, 
PTt 
Parallel to equation  (8) in the  text,  the demand  curve  for nontraded  good  z 
is 
YNrt(Z)  [PNt  ]CNt 
where  CNt  is aggregate  home  consumption  of  nontraded  goods.  Producers 
take CNt  as given. 
Assuming  (1  +  r) ,B  =  1, we can write the first-order conditions  for individ- 
ual maximization  as 
CTt+ I  =  CTt,  (A2) 
'y  PTt(Mt<  PTt  /  y 
-  =  X  -/  P  C  )  (A3)  C  Tt  PtPt  Pt+  I  Ct 
CNt  -  I  Tt-C,  (A4) 
ly  \Nt/ 
and 
Y(Z  (+1)1/0  =(0  -  0  -  C) C-(CA  )1/0.  (A5) EXCHANGE RATE DYNAMICS  657 
Substituting  (A2) into  (A3) yields 
Mt  xPTtCrt(1  + it~l  Mt  [xp~l~rt 71  .  t)]  ,  (A6) 
where  the  nominal  interest  rate is it =  (PTt+  1PTt)(l  +  r)  -  1. 
Note  that, under  the present  separable utility function,  agents smooth con- 
sumption  of traded  goods  independently  of nontraded  goods  production  or 
consumption.  Since production  is constant  at YT, this implies  that 
CTt =  YT  (A7) 
for  all t, under  the  assumption  of  zero  initial net  foreign  assets.  Thus  the 
economy  runs a balanced  current  account  regardless  of shocks to money  or 
productivity  in nontraded  goods. 
We  again  begin  by deriving  the  steady-state  equilibrium  in  which  prices 
are fully flexible and the money  supply is constant.  In the symmetric (among 
domestic  residents)  market  equilibrium,  CNt  =  YNt(z) =  CA  for  all z; thus 
equation  (AS) implies  that, in the steady state, 
[(0-  1)(1  -y)1/2 
YN  CN  =  6K  ]  (A8) 
In a steady state with a constant  money  supply,  prices of traded  goods  must 
be constant.  The  equilibrium  price  level,  P.  may be  found  using  equations 
(A4)  and  (A6)-(A8),  together  with PTt+  1  =  PTt,  which  follows  from  the  no 
speculative  bubbles  condition.  Here  long-run  monetary  neutrality  obtains 
since money  shocks do  not affect  wealth. 
In the short run,  prices of nontraded  goods  are fixed  at PN and output  of 
nontraded  goods  is demand  determined.  Because  PN(Z)IPN  =  1, the  short- 
run demand  for nontraded  goods  is given  by 
YN(Z) =  CN.  (A9) 
Combining  equations  (A4), (A7), and  (A9) yields 
YN=CN=  -Y(AlO) 
YN =CN  ly  (;)YTI  A0 
which  gives YN and  CN as functions  Of PT.  To  solve  for  short-run  PT  (recall 
that traded  goods  prices are flexible),  log-linearize  the money  demand  equa- 
tion  (A6): 
E(M_-P)  = PT-P  +  1_  (PT -PT)  (Al 1) 
As in the text, hatted variables are short-run deviations from the initial steady 
state  and  hatted  variables  with  overbars  are  long-run  deviations  from  the 
initial  steady  state.  Log-differentiating  the  price  index  equation  (A1),  with 
PN fixed,  yields the  short-run  price-level  response 
A 
P =  YPT-  (A  12) 658  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Finally, since money is neutral in the long run and the money shock is perma- 
nent,  we have 
PT=M=M.  (A13) 
Substituting  the last two relationships  into equation  (All)  yields 
PT 
= E  =  f  +  (I  _  Pl  _  -f +,.Ye) M.  (A14) 
Note  that the  price of  traded  goods  changes  in proportion  to the  exchange 
rate because  the  law of  one  price  holds  for  tradables and  the country  does 
not have any market  power in tradables. 
From (A 14), we can see that, if e >  1, the nominal exchange  rate overshoots 
its long-run  level. To understand  why overshooting  depends  on {, notice that 
1  /e is the consumption  elasticity of money demand.  Suppose,  for the moment, 
that  PT  =  M,  so  that  there  is  neither  over-  nor  undershooting.  Then,  by 
equation  (A 12), the supply  of  real balances would  have to rise by M  -  = 
(1  -  y)AM.  From equations  (A6),  (A7),  and  (A12),  we see  that, in this case, 
the demand  for real balances will rise by (Ik/)(l-  y)M.  If e >  1, the demand 
for  real balances  will rise by less than the  supply  and  the  price of  tradables 
(the exchange  rate) would  have to rise further  to reach equilibrium,  thereby 
overshooting  its long-run  level. 
Finally, observe  that an unanticipated  rise in money  supply  is unambigu- 
ously welfare improving  at home: output rises in the monopolistic  nontraded- 
goods  sector and  (as one  can show) real money  balances also rise. 
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